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Writer's pictureVANESSA LÓPEZ

ArcaneDoor: Cyberespionage campaign that exploits vulnerabilities in Cisco network devices

ArcaneDoor is a campaign that is the latest example of state-sponsored actors targeting perimeter network devices from multiple vendors.


This campaign targeted government networks globally by exploiting multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) firewalls.


The attack chain leveraged two custom malware implants, “Line Dancer” and “Line Runner,” to gain persistent access and remote control over compromised ASA devices.


Line Dancer was an in-memory shellcode interpreter that allowed arbitrary payloads to be executed, while Line Runner provided a persistent backdoor by abusing the preloading functionality of a legacy VPN client.


Line Dancer provided the ability to disable logging, capture device configurations, sniff network traffic, execute CLI commands, and even bypass authentication mechanisms.


It plugged critical functions such as memory dumps to make forensic analysis difficult and rebooted devices to remove themselves from memory.


Recommendations:


Cisco device users are recommended to update their devices to the corrected software versions to block potential attacks. It is also advisable to closely monitor system logs for signs of suspicious activity and set up multi-factor authentication (MFA) for added security.


Record events in a central, secure location. And configure strong and multi-factor authentication (MFA).


Follow the instructions Cisco has provided to verify the integrity of ASA or FTD devices in its guidance.


Customers can use the following steps to verify the integrity of their Cisco ASA or FTD devices:


1. Log in to the suspected device CLI.

2. Note: On devices that are running Cisco FTD Software, switch to the Cisco ASA CLI using the system support diagnostic-cli command.

3. Use the enable command to switch to privileged EXEC mode.

4. Note: On devices running Cisco FTD Software, the enable password is blank.

5. Collect the outputs of the following commands:

- Show version

            - Check /SHA-512 system:memory/text

            - Debug menu memory

6. Open a case with the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). In the case, reference the ArcaneDoor keyword and upload the data that was collected in Step 3.


Priority: High


Indicators of Compromise (IoC):

Infrastructure displaced by Actor:


192.36.57[.]181

185.167.60[.]85

185.227.111[.]17

176.31.18[.]153

172.105.90[.]154

185.244.210[.]120

45.86.163[.]224

172.105.94[.]93

213.156.138[.]77

89.44.198[.]189

45.77.52[.]253

103.114.200[.]230

212.193.2[.]48

51.15.145[.]37

89.44.198[.]196

131.196.252[.]148

213.156.138[.]78

121.227.168[.]69

213.156.138[.]68

194.4.49[.]6

185.244.210[.]65

216.238.75[.]155


Multi-Tenant Infrastructure:


5.183.95[.]95

45.63.119[.]131

45.76.118[.]87

45.77.54[.]14

45.86.163[.]244

45.128.134[.]189

89.44.198[.]16

96.44.159[.]46

103.20.222[.]218

103.27.132[.]69

103.51.140[.]101

103.119.3[.]230

103.125.218[.198

104.156.232[.]22

107.148.19[.]88

107.172.16[.]208

107.173.140[.]111

121.37.174[.]139

139.162.135[.]12

149.28.166[.]244

152.70.83[.]47

154.22.235[.]13

154.22.235[.]17

154.39.142[.]47

172.233.245[.]241

185.123.101[.]250

192.210.137[.]35

194.32.78[.]183

205.234.232[.]196

207.148.74[.]250

216.155.157[.]136

216.238.66[.]251

216.238.71[.]49

216.238.72[.]201

216.238.74[.]95

216.238.81[.]149

216.238.85[.]220

216.238.86[.]24


CVE-2024-20353: Denial of service.

CVE-2024-20359: Persistent local code execution.


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